❓ A WA parliamentary question investigates the Babbington Forest Block fire near Northcliffe in February 2012, covering the fire's origin, management, impact, and backburning activities. The detailed response provides specific information on the fire's progression and the Department of Environment and Conservation's (DEC) actions.
AnsweredQoN 5313Legislative Council
QuestionView source ↗
In relation to the Babbington Forest Block fire near Northcliffe in February 2012, I ask -
(1) When, where and how did the fire start? Please include details of the land tenure and category as well as the vegetation type and logging history where the fire started.
(2) When did the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) become aware of the fire?
(3) Which DEC office was responsible for managing the fire?
(4) Which other DEC offices were involved in the management of the fire and what were their tasks and responsibilities?
(5) Was a decision made to let the fire burn to a certain set of boundaries?
(6) If yes to (5) -
(a) when was this decision made;
(b) what were these intended boundaries (please table a map);
(c) was this decision made after an on-ground inspection of the fire had been carried out;
(d) what were the strategic advantages of allowing the fire to burn to the intended boundaries;
(e) were other operational approaches considered and/or employed;
(f) if yes to (6)(e) -
(i) what were they;
(ii) were they carried out;
(iii) will the Minister please provide full details on what resources were employed and what management actions were implemented;
(g) did the fire burn beyond the intended boundaries;
(h) if yes to (6)(g) -
(i) what were the circumstances that led to the fire not being contained within the intended boundaries;
(ii) could these circumstances have been predicted;
(iii) if these circumstances had been predicted, could the fire have been prevented from burning beyond the intended boundaries (please provide full details);
(i) was a contingency plan in place, for the event that the fire did burn beyond the intended boundaries; and
(j) how did DEC respond when the fire burnt beyond the intended boundaries? Please provide full details of what resources were employed and what management actions were implemented.
(7) What was the total area burnt in the Babbington fire? Please table a map.
(8) What flora and fauna values are known to exist within the area burnt by the Babbington fire?
(9) What plans were put in place to protect these values?
(10) Have on-ground flora and fauna surveys been conducted since the fire to assess impacts?
(11) If yes to (10), when were they conducted and with what results? Please provide full details of the impacts found to have resulted from the fire.
(12) If no to (10), when will such surveys be conducted?
(13) Were fires (back burns) lit to manage the spread of the fire?
(14) If yes to (13) -
(a) where were fires lit;
(b) on what dates;
(c) for what strategic purpose;
(d) for each fires lit to manage the spread of the Babbington fire, how many hectares were burnt;
(e) what flora and fauna values are known to exist within the back burnt areas; and
(f) how were these flora and fauna values catered for?
(15) What was the total area burnt, including any extra areas burnt outside the boundaries of the fire for management purposes?
(16) How long had it been since those areas were last burnt? Please table a map showing the 'fuel ages' (immediately prior to the February 2012 fire) of all parts of the total area burnt.
(17) What percentage of the entire area was burnt?
(18) What area of regenerating forest was burnt? Please include details of the type of forest in your answer.
(19) Immediately following the fire, were there any unburnt pockets within the boundaries of the fire?
(20) If yes to (19) -
(a) have they been/will they be deliberately burnt out (blacked out); and
(b) if yes to (20)(a), what impact is this expected to have on fauna surviving in these previously unburnt pockets?
(1) When, where and how did the fire start? Please include details of the land tenure and category as well as the vegetation type and logging history where the fire started.
(2) When did the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) become aware of the fire?
(3) Which DEC office was responsible for managing the fire?
(4) Which other DEC offices were involved in the management of the fire and what were their tasks and responsibilities?
(5) Was a decision made to let the fire burn to a certain set of boundaries?
(6) If yes to (5) -
(a) when was this decision made;
(b) what were these intended boundaries (please table a map);
(c) was this decision made after an on-ground inspection of the fire had been carried out;
(d) what were the strategic advantages of allowing the fire to burn to the intended boundaries;
(e) were other operational approaches considered and/or employed;
(f) if yes to (6)(e) -
(i) what were they;
(ii) were they carried out;
(iii) will the Minister please provide full details on what resources were employed and what management actions were implemented;
(g) did the fire burn beyond the intended boundaries;
(h) if yes to (6)(g) -
(i) what were the circumstances that led to the fire not being contained within the intended boundaries;
(ii) could these circumstances have been predicted;
(iii) if these circumstances had been predicted, could the fire have been prevented from burning beyond the intended boundaries (please provide full details);
(i) was a contingency plan in place, for the event that the fire did burn beyond the intended boundaries; and
(j) how did DEC respond when the fire burnt beyond the intended boundaries? Please provide full details of what resources were employed and what management actions were implemented.
(7) What was the total area burnt in the Babbington fire? Please table a map.
(8) What flora and fauna values are known to exist within the area burnt by the Babbington fire?
(9) What plans were put in place to protect these values?
(10) Have on-ground flora and fauna surveys been conducted since the fire to assess impacts?
(11) If yes to (10), when were they conducted and with what results? Please provide full details of the impacts found to have resulted from the fire.
(12) If no to (10), when will such surveys be conducted?
(13) Were fires (back burns) lit to manage the spread of the fire?
(14) If yes to (13) -
(a) where were fires lit;
(b) on what dates;
(c) for what strategic purpose;
(d) for each fires lit to manage the spread of the Babbington fire, how many hectares were burnt;
(e) what flora and fauna values are known to exist within the back burnt areas; and
(f) how were these flora and fauna values catered for?
(15) What was the total area burnt, including any extra areas burnt outside the boundaries of the fire for management purposes?
(16) How long had it been since those areas were last burnt? Please table a map showing the 'fuel ages' (immediately prior to the February 2012 fire) of all parts of the total area burnt.
(17) What percentage of the entire area was burnt?
(18) What area of regenerating forest was burnt? Please include details of the type of forest in your answer.
(19) Immediately following the fire, were there any unburnt pockets within the boundaries of the fire?
(20) If yes to (19) -
(a) have they been/will they be deliberately burnt out (blacked out); and
(b) if yes to (20)(a), what impact is this expected to have on fauna surviving in these previously unburnt pockets?
AnswerView source ↗
Answered
15 May 2012
Responded by
Minister for Mental Health representing the Minister for Environment
Response time
56 days
(1) The fire started shortly before 12.05 pm on 10 February 2012 as a result of a lightning strike. Babbington block, 35 kilometres southeast of Northcliffe, is in Shannon National Park and comprises unlogged jarrah woodland.
(2) 12.09 pm on 10 February.
(3) Donnelly District office at Pemberton and Warren Regional office at Manjimup at various stages of the incident.
(4) Northcliffe work centre, as a field operations point and staging area.
(5) Yes
(6) (a) 3.30 pm on 10 February.
(b) Chesapeake Road, Gardner River Road, Buldania Road, Micks Track, KTC Road, Wren Road, Babbington Road and Deeside Coast Road. [see tabled paper no]
(c) Yes
(d) Direct attack with machinery and fire trucks assisted by water bombers failed due to severe fire intensity and boggy terrain. These roads were the closest existing roads to initiate an indirect attack.
(e) No
(f) (i-ii)
Not applicable
(iii)
For the first shift of the fire suppression effort, 51 personnel, eight fire trucks, three earthmoving machines, four fixed-wing water bombers, a spotter aircraft and an air attack aircraft were deployed. Management actions included a combination of direct attack using earthmoving equipment and water bombers and indirect attack by back burning off existing roads and tracks.
(g) Yes
(h) (i)
Burning embers carried beyond the containment lines and started new spot fires due to extreme fire behaviour and heavy fuel loads. DEC staff observations indicated fire rates of spread up to 1,100 metres per hour and spotting distances of up to five kilometres.
(ii)
Yes, the Project Vesta fire behaviour predictions for 10 February indicated a fire rate of spread of 550 metres per hour, a flame height of five metres and a spotting distance of 600 metres.
(iii)
No, the burning embers carried beyond the intended containment lines during the night and into inaccessible areas containing long unburnt fuels. This resulted in the fire containment strategy being revised to contain the fire at the next established access track.
(i) Yes
(j) For the start of the second shift at approximately 7.00am on 11 February, DEC activated one of its Preformed Incident Management teams and deployed 93 personnel, 17 fire appliances, eight earthmoving machines and four water bombing aircraft to the fire. Fireground personnel protected assets within the national park and private property and initiated another indirect attack on the fire by back burning along Chesapeake and Lower Gardner Roads.
(7) 33 784 hectares. [see tabled paper no]
(8) A mix of karri and jarrah forests and south coastal plain containing ecosystems such as wetlands, marshlands, rock outcrops, coastal heathlands and woodlands, 28 species of threatened flora, 16 species of threatened fauna and two priority listed ecological communities.
(9) Tactics to minimise fire intensity and disturbance by machinery were used during the fire suppression operations. These included indirect attack using existing roads and tracks after initial direct attack failed, burning areas out during the night to minimise fire intensity, as well as avoiding disturbance in areas of known threatened flora populations and not using fire retardants near wetlands.
(10) No. Only initial reconnaissance to determine the area burnt has been carried out.
(11) Not applicable
(12) Spring 2012 and autumn 2013.
(13) Yes
(14) (a) Chesapeake Roadbetween Deeside Coast Roadand Steve's Track. Wren and Babbington Roads. Micks Track and Buldania Road. Gardner River Road. Unnamed track from Chesapeake Road to Broke Inlet. Chesapeake Road between Lower Gardner Road and Laws Track. Scott Road and Laws Track. Unnamed track between Laws Track and Gardner River Road. Lake Florence Track. Windy Harbour Road. Unnamed track from Windy Harbour Road to the Southern Ocean.
(b) 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21 and 22 February.
(c) As part of the indirect attack to contain the bushfire and prevent it impacting on the settlement of WindyHarbour, the farming community south and east of Northcliffe and the town of Northcliffe.
(d) This is unable to be determined. There was no real time imagery taken to determine what was burnt from back burning operations and the main head fire.
(e) See the answer to (8).
(f) See the answer to (9).
(15) See the answer to (7).
(16) [see tabled paper no]
(17) About 87%.
(18) 2 340 hectares of karri regrowth forest.
(19) Yes
(20) (a) Some unburnt pockets were burnt out to achieve burn security standards and prevent further breaches of containment lines.
(b) The impact is difficult to determine but is expected to be minimal over time due to recolonisation from adjacent unburnt areas.
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(2) 12.09 pm on 10 February.
(3) Donnelly District office at Pemberton and Warren Regional office at Manjimup at various stages of the incident.
(4) Northcliffe work centre, as a field operations point and staging area.
(5) Yes
(6) (a) 3.30 pm on 10 February.
(b) Chesapeake Road, Gardner River Road, Buldania Road, Micks Track, KTC Road, Wren Road, Babbington Road and Deeside Coast Road. [see tabled paper no]
(c) Yes
(d) Direct attack with machinery and fire trucks assisted by water bombers failed due to severe fire intensity and boggy terrain. These roads were the closest existing roads to initiate an indirect attack.
(e) No
(f) (i-ii)
Not applicable
(iii)
For the first shift of the fire suppression effort, 51 personnel, eight fire trucks, three earthmoving machines, four fixed-wing water bombers, a spotter aircraft and an air attack aircraft were deployed. Management actions included a combination of direct attack using earthmoving equipment and water bombers and indirect attack by back burning off existing roads and tracks.
(g) Yes
(h) (i)
Burning embers carried beyond the containment lines and started new spot fires due to extreme fire behaviour and heavy fuel loads. DEC staff observations indicated fire rates of spread up to 1,100 metres per hour and spotting distances of up to five kilometres.
(ii)
Yes, the Project Vesta fire behaviour predictions for 10 February indicated a fire rate of spread of 550 metres per hour, a flame height of five metres and a spotting distance of 600 metres.
(iii)
No, the burning embers carried beyond the intended containment lines during the night and into inaccessible areas containing long unburnt fuels. This resulted in the fire containment strategy being revised to contain the fire at the next established access track.
(i) Yes
(j) For the start of the second shift at approximately 7.00am on 11 February, DEC activated one of its Preformed Incident Management teams and deployed 93 personnel, 17 fire appliances, eight earthmoving machines and four water bombing aircraft to the fire. Fireground personnel protected assets within the national park and private property and initiated another indirect attack on the fire by back burning along Chesapeake and Lower Gardner Roads.
(7) 33 784 hectares. [see tabled paper no]
(8) A mix of karri and jarrah forests and south coastal plain containing ecosystems such as wetlands, marshlands, rock outcrops, coastal heathlands and woodlands, 28 species of threatened flora, 16 species of threatened fauna and two priority listed ecological communities.
(9) Tactics to minimise fire intensity and disturbance by machinery were used during the fire suppression operations. These included indirect attack using existing roads and tracks after initial direct attack failed, burning areas out during the night to minimise fire intensity, as well as avoiding disturbance in areas of known threatened flora populations and not using fire retardants near wetlands.
(10) No. Only initial reconnaissance to determine the area burnt has been carried out.
(11) Not applicable
(12) Spring 2012 and autumn 2013.
(13) Yes
(14) (a) Chesapeake Roadbetween Deeside Coast Roadand Steve's Track. Wren and Babbington Roads. Micks Track and Buldania Road. Gardner River Road. Unnamed track from Chesapeake Road to Broke Inlet. Chesapeake Road between Lower Gardner Road and Laws Track. Scott Road and Laws Track. Unnamed track between Laws Track and Gardner River Road. Lake Florence Track. Windy Harbour Road. Unnamed track from Windy Harbour Road to the Southern Ocean.
(b) 11, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21 and 22 February.
(c) As part of the indirect attack to contain the bushfire and prevent it impacting on the settlement of WindyHarbour, the farming community south and east of Northcliffe and the town of Northcliffe.
(d) This is unable to be determined. There was no real time imagery taken to determine what was burnt from back burning operations and the main head fire.
(e) See the answer to (8).
(f) See the answer to (9).
(15) See the answer to (7).
(16) [see tabled paper no]
(17) About 87%.
(18) 2 340 hectares of karri regrowth forest.
(19) Yes
(20) (a) Some unburnt pockets were burnt out to achieve burn security standards and prevent further breaches of containment lines.
(b) The impact is difficult to determine but is expected to be minimal over time due to recolonisation from adjacent unburnt areas.
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