❓ A WA parliamentary question on notice regarding the safety and security of liquid ammonia and ammonium nitrate storage and processing facilities in Western Australia. The response provides some information while citing security concerns for withholding specific location data.
AnsweredQoN 76Legislative Council
QuestionView source ↗
(1) Are there any current or proposed facilities in Western Australia which store or process liquid ammonia, or ammonium nitrate?
(2) If yes to (1):
(a) where are they located or proposed to be located;
(b) how far are those identified in (a) each located from residential populations;
(c) how far are those identified in (a) each located from the nearest industrial facilities;
(d) how far are those identified in (a) each located from other critical infrastructure, LNG plants, etc.; and
(e) how far are those identified in (a) each located from significant environmental and heritage places?
(3) What is the estimated blast radius of each facility identified in (2)(a)?
(4) If the answer to (3) is not known, why not?
(5) What measures are in place to prevent overheating or explosions at each facility:
(a) if none, why not; and
(b) if not known, why not?
(6) In the event of an explosion, what measures are in place to protect the employees of the facilities, nearby workers and residents, and surrounding infrastructure?
(7) What is the level of liability insurance provide by each of the proponents for each facility to cover the unthinkable eventuality of an explosion, and is this sufficient to cover such an eventuality?
(8) Which is the inspectorate that oversees the inspection and safety of such plants or facilities?
(9) How often are these plants or facilities inspected?
(10) When were the last inspections of these plants or facilities?
(11) Have any of these plants or facilities been found to be non-compliant with their management of safety requirements in the past two years:
(a) if yes, which plants or facilities; and
(b) if yes, on what dates and on how many occasions?
(12) As a result of Cyclone Carlos in February 2011 shutting down Varanus Island gas supply did Burrup Fertilisers lose gas supply?
(13) If yes to (12), did thousands of litres of ammonia start warming in their storage tanks which would have needed to be released into the atmosphere within hours if gas could not be immediately restored?
(14) Were contingencies put in place to evacuate nearby industry and the town of Dampier as a result of the heightened risk of an ammonia leak or explosion?
(2) If yes to (1):
(a) where are they located or proposed to be located;
(b) how far are those identified in (a) each located from residential populations;
(c) how far are those identified in (a) each located from the nearest industrial facilities;
(d) how far are those identified in (a) each located from other critical infrastructure, LNG plants, etc.; and
(e) how far are those identified in (a) each located from significant environmental and heritage places?
(3) What is the estimated blast radius of each facility identified in (2)(a)?
(4) If the answer to (3) is not known, why not?
(5) What measures are in place to prevent overheating or explosions at each facility:
(a) if none, why not; and
(b) if not known, why not?
(6) In the event of an explosion, what measures are in place to protect the employees of the facilities, nearby workers and residents, and surrounding infrastructure?
(7) What is the level of liability insurance provide by each of the proponents for each facility to cover the unthinkable eventuality of an explosion, and is this sufficient to cover such an eventuality?
(8) Which is the inspectorate that oversees the inspection and safety of such plants or facilities?
(9) How often are these plants or facilities inspected?
(10) When were the last inspections of these plants or facilities?
(11) Have any of these plants or facilities been found to be non-compliant with their management of safety requirements in the past two years:
(a) if yes, which plants or facilities; and
(b) if yes, on what dates and on how many occasions?
(12) As a result of Cyclone Carlos in February 2011 shutting down Varanus Island gas supply did Burrup Fertilisers lose gas supply?
(13) If yes to (12), did thousands of litres of ammonia start warming in their storage tanks which would have needed to be released into the atmosphere within hours if gas could not be immediately restored?
(14) Were contingencies put in place to evacuate nearby industry and the town of Dampier as a result of the heightened risk of an ammonia leak or explosion?
AnswerView source ↗
Answered
18 June 2013
Responded by
Minister for Agriculture and Food representing the Minister for Mines and Petroleum
Response time
33 days
(1) Yes
(2) (a)-(e) Ammonia is sought by some people for illegal purposes and
ammonium nitrate is regulated for security purposes, therefore site details for
facilities storing these substances are considered security
sensitive. However, I am happy to arrange for the Department of Mines and
Petroleum to provide the Member with a briefing on the matters raised.
(3) "Blast radius" is not a defined term. For 500 tonnes
of ammonium nitrate (the maximum stack size at most facilities), the
recommended minimum separation distance is 890 metres to residential
development and 1,110 metres to vulnerable facilities. At 280 metres there
is a 50% chance of fatality inside a building from such an explosion and
slightly less outside a building.
(4) Not applicable
(5) (a)-(b) Ammonium nitrate storage facilities are required to keep
this material away from combustible materials and sources of
contamination. These measures will completely eliminate any potential for
explosion. Liquid ammonia is kept cold by refrigeration and insulation and
is not prone to explosions.
(6) All licensed dangerous goods sites are required to have an
emergency plan. For larger sites and major hazard facilities this plan
must be developed in consultation with the Department of Fire and Emergency
Services. Where off-site impacts may be possible, that plan must include
measures to notify and if necessary evacuate potentially affected
sites. If a fire got out of control at an ammonium nitrate storage site,
the appropriate emergency response is to evacuate to a safe distance.
(7) The Department of Mines and Petroleum has no knowledge of
individual company public liability insurance policies. These would be in
accordance with standard industry practices.
(8) Inspections for chemical safety and security at these facilities
are carried out by the Department of Mines and Petroleum's Dangerous Goods
Safety Branch in accordance with the Dangerous Goods Safety Act
2004 . General occupational safety and health inspections are carried
out by WorkSafe WA.
(9) Major hazard facilities are visited proactively three times a year,
including one formal audit, and reactively as required in response to
incidents. Some sites are inspected annually but most are inspected
approximately once every five years in accordance with Dangerous Goods Safety's
routine inspection program.
(10) Refer to answer (2) (a)-(e).
(11) (a)-(b) Almost every inspection identifies one or more
non-compliances. However, none of the identified non-compliances were
serious enough to warrant enforcement action beyond issue of a remediation
notice.
(12) Yes. However, there was still some gas available from the
Dampier Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline.
(13) No. There was sufficient gas available to provide power to keep
the ammonia in the storage tanks at the required temperature.
(14) No. Had there been no gas at all, back-up diesel generators
would have provided the power required to maintain cooling, and in the unlikely
event of no power at all the ammonia would have been burnt off via the
flare.
(2) (a)-(e) Ammonia is sought by some people for illegal purposes and
ammonium nitrate is regulated for security purposes, therefore site details for
facilities storing these substances are considered security
sensitive. However, I am happy to arrange for the Department of Mines and
Petroleum to provide the Member with a briefing on the matters raised.
(3) "Blast radius" is not a defined term. For 500 tonnes
of ammonium nitrate (the maximum stack size at most facilities), the
recommended minimum separation distance is 890 metres to residential
development and 1,110 metres to vulnerable facilities. At 280 metres there
is a 50% chance of fatality inside a building from such an explosion and
slightly less outside a building.
(4) Not applicable
(5) (a)-(b) Ammonium nitrate storage facilities are required to keep
this material away from combustible materials and sources of
contamination. These measures will completely eliminate any potential for
explosion. Liquid ammonia is kept cold by refrigeration and insulation and
is not prone to explosions.
(6) All licensed dangerous goods sites are required to have an
emergency plan. For larger sites and major hazard facilities this plan
must be developed in consultation with the Department of Fire and Emergency
Services. Where off-site impacts may be possible, that plan must include
measures to notify and if necessary evacuate potentially affected
sites. If a fire got out of control at an ammonium nitrate storage site,
the appropriate emergency response is to evacuate to a safe distance.
(7) The Department of Mines and Petroleum has no knowledge of
individual company public liability insurance policies. These would be in
accordance with standard industry practices.
(8) Inspections for chemical safety and security at these facilities
are carried out by the Department of Mines and Petroleum's Dangerous Goods
Safety Branch in accordance with the Dangerous Goods Safety Act
2004 . General occupational safety and health inspections are carried
out by WorkSafe WA.
(9) Major hazard facilities are visited proactively three times a year,
including one formal audit, and reactively as required in response to
incidents. Some sites are inspected annually but most are inspected
approximately once every five years in accordance with Dangerous Goods Safety's
routine inspection program.
(10) Refer to answer (2) (a)-(e).
(11) (a)-(b) Almost every inspection identifies one or more
non-compliances. However, none of the identified non-compliances were
serious enough to warrant enforcement action beyond issue of a remediation
notice.
(12) Yes. However, there was still some gas available from the
Dampier Bunbury Natural Gas Pipeline.
(13) No. There was sufficient gas available to provide power to keep
the ammonia in the storage tanks at the required temperature.
(14) No. Had there been no gas at all, back-up diesel generators
would have provided the power required to maintain cooling, and in the unlikely
event of no power at all the ammonia would have been burnt off via the
flare.
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