A parliamentary question regarding the handling of a fire at West Cape Howe National Park, focusing on the Department of Conservation and Land Management's (CALM) fire management strategies and the rejection of external assistance. The Minister defends CALM's actions, stating they acted responsibly.

AnsweredQoN 366Legislative Council
Asked
13 December 2001
Portfolio
the Environment and Heritage

QuestionView source ↗

With regards to the fire at West Cape Howe National Park -
(1) Can the Minister confirm that at 7.00pm on Monday, November 5 2001, a small arson lit fire was surrounded by a CALM lit fire to existing tracks?
(2) Can the Minister confirm that at 7.30am on Tuesday, November 6 2001, Frontline Fire Fighting offered CALM the use of a special fire fighter capable of traversing the coastal hills and extinguishing the still small fire?
(3) Can the Minister confirm that this offer was refused?
(4) Can the Minister confirm that by 9.00am on the same morning, the fire that had been enlarged by CALM expanded significantly due to strong winds into a fire that burnt for four weeks?
(5) Does the Minister agree that it would have been preferable to use the all-terrain equipment?
(6) Why was the offer of equipment refused?
(7) Will the Minister conduct an inquiry into CALM’s failure to protect West Cape Howe National Park?

AnswerView source ↗

Answered
19 February 2002
Responded by
Minister for Housing and Works representing the Minister for the Environment and Heritage
Response time
68 days
Fallback options were considered and a decision made to backburn from Dunsky's Track. This was attempted overnight, however the likelihood of success was considered to be moderate. Consequently, a fallback strategy was adopted. This strategy involved opening up Lake William Road with a D6 dozer that was at the fire. This was implemented overnight. (2) I can confirm that Frontline Fire Fighting offered the Department of Conservation and Land Management the use of a machine. However, the machine has been assessed by the Department and other fire fighting organisations as being unsuitable and it was not capable of traversing the steep slopes of West Cape Howe at the fire ignition point. (3) Yes, for the reasons stated in 2 and in view of the presence of a suitable machine onsite as stated in 1. (4) The Department of Conservation and Land Management attempted to contain the fire to a minimal size by backburning. At 10.00 am the main fire jumped over the edging and Dunsky's Track due to very strong winds, resulting in an expanded area out to the fallback control line. The fire was contained to the north within two days but continued to burn out internally over the next few weeks. This strategy was adopted rather than creating many kilometres of suppression breaks within this fragile environment. Forecast rainfall over the two weeks never eventuated, resulting in most of the 1200 hectares of the Cape burning out. (5) No. (6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
(2) I can confirm that Frontline Fire Fighting offered the Department of Conservation and Land Management the use of a machine. However, the machine has been assessed by the Department and other fire fighting organisations as being unsuitable and it was not capable of traversing the steep slopes of West Cape Howe at the fire ignition point. (3) Yes, for the reasons stated in 2 and in view of the presence of a suitable machine onsite as stated in 1. (4) The Department of Conservation and Land Management attempted to contain the fire to a minimal size by backburning. At 10.00 am the main fire jumped over the edging and Dunsky's Track due to very strong winds, resulting in an expanded area out to the fallback control line. The fire was contained to the north within two days but continued to burn out internally over the next few weeks. This strategy was adopted rather than creating many kilometres of suppression breaks within this fragile environment. Forecast rainfall over the two weeks never eventuated, resulting in most of the 1200 hectares of the Cape burning out. (5) No. (6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
(3) Yes, for the reasons stated in 2 and in view of the presence of a suitable machine onsite as stated in 1. (4) The Department of Conservation and Land Management attempted to contain the fire to a minimal size by backburning. At 10.00 am the main fire jumped over the edging and Dunsky's Track due to very strong winds, resulting in an expanded area out to the fallback control line. The fire was contained to the north within two days but continued to burn out internally over the next few weeks. This strategy was adopted rather than creating many kilometres of suppression breaks within this fragile environment. Forecast rainfall over the two weeks never eventuated, resulting in most of the 1200 hectares of the Cape burning out. (5) No. (6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
(4) The Department of Conservation and Land Management attempted to contain the fire to a minimal size by backburning. At 10.00 am the main fire jumped over the edging and Dunsky's Track due to very strong winds, resulting in an expanded area out to the fallback control line. The fire was contained to the north within two days but continued to burn out internally over the next few weeks. This strategy was adopted rather than creating many kilometres of suppression breaks within this fragile environment. Forecast rainfall over the two weeks never eventuated, resulting in most of the 1200 hectares of the Cape burning out. (5) No. (6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
The fire was contained to the north within two days but continued to burn out internally over the next few weeks. This strategy was adopted rather than creating many kilometres of suppression breaks within this fragile environment. Forecast rainfall over the two weeks never eventuated, resulting in most of the 1200 hectares of the Cape burning out. (5) No. (6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
(5) No. (6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
(6) See 1 to 3. (7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.
(7) No. I consider that the Department acted responsibly in the best interests of the environment and safety of firefighters from the Department and local brigades.

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