❓ A parliamentary question on notice addresses the Minister for Energy regarding the Cronin report on the Western Power crisis, questioning his responsibility and the impact of government policy. The Minister defends the report's scope and outlines steps to prevent future incidents, referencing a similar past event.
AnsweredQoN 202Legislative Assembly
QuestionView source ↗
I refer the minister to the report of the Cronin committee of review into black Wednesday, which states - The power supply crisis of 16 to 18 February 2004, and Western Power’s poor management of it, were largely attributable to . . . Deficiencies in forecasting and planning, . . . crisis management planning . . . leadership culture. (1) Does the minister acknowledge that, as Minister for Energy, he is ultimately responsible for the failings of Western Power as described in the Cronin report? (2) Will he admit that there are deficiencies in that report because it considered neither his role in the debacle nor his management of the organisation? (3) Does he concede that under his management and his Government’s policy of breaking up Western Power, the organisation has been geared towards its own destruction, rather than maintaining an essential service for the people of Western Australia? Mr E.S. RIPPER
AnswerView source ↗
(1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
(2) Will he admit that there are deficiencies in that report because it considered neither his role in the debacle nor his management of the organisation? (3) Does he concede that under his management and his Government’s policy of breaking up Western Power, the organisation has been geared towards its own destruction, rather than maintaining an essential service for the people of Western Australia? Mr E.S. RIPPER replied: (1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
(3) Does he concede that under his management and his Government’s policy of breaking up Western Power, the organisation has been geared towards its own destruction, rather than maintaining an essential service for the people of Western Australia? Mr E.S. RIPPER replied: (1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
Mr E.S. RIPPER replied: (1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
(1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
· there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations;
· it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations;
· SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations;
Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
(2) Will he admit that there are deficiencies in that report because it considered neither his role in the debacle nor his management of the organisation? (3) Does he concede that under his management and his Government’s policy of breaking up Western Power, the organisation has been geared towards its own destruction, rather than maintaining an essential service for the people of Western Australia? Mr E.S. RIPPER replied: (1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
(3) Does he concede that under his management and his Government’s policy of breaking up Western Power, the organisation has been geared towards its own destruction, rather than maintaining an essential service for the people of Western Australia? Mr E.S. RIPPER replied: (1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
Mr E.S. RIPPER replied: (1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
(1)-(3) I will start with the middle question, which asked whether the committee was able to examine the minister and the minister’s office. The committee was absolutely unfettered in what it was allowed to do in its inquiry. It certainly interviewed me and it certainly interviewed members of my staff. It was entirely free to make whatever observations it wanted to make. The report did show that there were deficiencies in forecasting and planning. Clearly, Western Power had planned to meet the demand on peak days. Clearly, Western Power had plans in place to deal with compressor maintenance on the pipeline. However, clearly it had not properly contemplated the scenario of successive peak days of energy demand and the impact that that would have on its ability to draw gas from the pipeline. Remarkably, although sophisticated modelling had been prepared by independent consultants, Western Power did not use that modelling. Rather, it used its own internal work to develop plans for the summer peak period. It did not draw to the attention of the Government, or indeed its own board, that it was using the internal modelling, not the more sophisticated external modelling that took some account of airconditioning loads. Further, although it had an outdated crisis management plan, it did not follow that plan. Finally, as every person could see on the day, its management of communications was terrible. That was not the only occasion on which that organisation and its predecessors had a problem. Two serious blackout incidents occurred in 1994, and the previous Government commissioned a report on the second of those incidents which reads - Monday, 23 May 1994 was a bad day for SECWA. On this day: · there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations; The report further outlined that the events that occurred at that time were, although infrequent, “not unusual”. In other words, they should have been planned for. The report stated that information management by the then State Energy Commission of WA was poor, and the performance was hampered by a lack of contingency or counter-disaster plans. The report outlined that it was not until the Tuesday that SECWA realised the extent of the problem and began its emergency meetings; this was well after the emergency had begun. It was not until the Wednesday that SECWA opened the emergency operations room. The report also criticised SECWA’s public relations, and specifically referred to “the lack of leadership shown in the management of public affairs and public accountability”. It is very disturbing that one can have the same criticisms made of the organisation over 10 years. It is remarkable that the criticisms made of the organisation in 2004 echo the criticisms that were made in 1994. One wonders whether a vigorous effort was made to implement the recommendations of this 1994 report and to respond to its findings. Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
· there was a backlog of work outstanding from the heavy wind and rain over the weekend; · it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations;
· it was an RDO (Rostered Day Off) for SECWA; · SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations;
· SECWA was in the process of undergoing a major organisational change, pending the separation of SECWA into gas and electricity corporations;
Leaving that aside, my responsibility as minister is to ensure that we do everything possible to avoid the chance of this type of event being repeated in the future. The board and the Government have accepted the findings of the Cronin review and will implement its recommendations. We will work as vigorously and cleverly as we can to avoid this sort of event affecting the people of Western Australia in the future.
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