❓ Mr Simpson asks about the positive outcomes of the 2009 works reform program. Mr Porter responds by highlighting cost overruns under the previous government and improvements under the current government, citing governance issues and project management as key factors.
AnsweredQoN 23Legislative Assembly
QuestionView source ↗
WORKS REFORM PROGRAM
Firstly, I congratulate the Treasurer on his new position and ask him to think about me and the seat of Darling Range during the budget review! Treasurer, as part of the Liberal–National government’s commitment to be financially responsible and accountable, I refer to the works reform project put in place by the government in 2009 to curb budget blow-outs. Will the Treasurer please update the house about any positive outcomes achieved by this program for WA taxpayers? Mr C.C. PORTER
Firstly, I congratulate the Treasurer on his new position and ask him to think about me and the seat of Darling Range during the budget review! Treasurer, as part of the Liberal–National government’s commitment to be financially responsible and accountable, I refer to the works reform project put in place by the government in 2009 to curb budget blow-outs. Will the Treasurer please update the house about any positive outcomes achieved by this program for WA taxpayers? Mr C.C. PORTER
AnswerView source ↗
I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Treasurer, as part of the Liberal–National government’s commitment to be financially responsible and accountable, I refer to the works reform project put in place by the government in 2009 to curb budget blow-outs. Will the Treasurer please update the house about any positive outcomes achieved by this program for WA taxpayers? Mr C.C. PORTER replied: I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER replied: I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk.
The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Treasurer, as part of the Liberal–National government’s commitment to be financially responsible and accountable, I refer to the works reform project put in place by the government in 2009 to curb budget blow-outs. Will the Treasurer please update the house about any positive outcomes achieved by this program for WA taxpayers? Mr C.C. PORTER replied: I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER replied: I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
I thank the member for his question. Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Yes, it is the case that in early 2009 the Liberal–National government adopted a works reform program. The reason we did that was that there were very notable and very large cost increases for major infrastructure projects under the previous government. I do not intend to labour the point here with respect to those. A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
A member interjected. Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : That has already been done, member. However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
However, I note two things. It was obviously the case that the previous government encountered some difficulties occasioned by a very competitive construction market. Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : And you built on our work. Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : Indeed. However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
However, there were also some problems that were squarely about governance, administration and the types of systems that the previous government had in place but did not observe. It is stated in the Auditor General’s report into the planning and management of Perth Arena — A lack of effective governance and oversight as existed on the Arena project demonstrates how poorly thought through decisions can expose the state to serious risks. Without the visibility and scrutiny that comes with effective governance the early warning signs of projects going wrong are more likely to be missed, as are opportunities to put them back on track. Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk. The problems that occurred were that in far too many instances there was noncompliance, which was the former government’s own strategic asset management framework. There were too many projects that proceeded to the tender stage without a full or, indeed, any business case being proffered. The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Experience on the Arena project also shows that circumventing normal processes and project administration for speed or expediency is a significant risk.
The response of this government has been thoroughgoing. The works component of the former Department of Housing and Works and the Office of Strategic Projects was transferred early to Department of Treasury and Finance. Responsibility for business case development reverted from all line agencies to the new section of DTF. When we look at the new children’s hospital project, which is budgeted at a total cost of $1.17 billion — Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : Was there a business case for Oakajee? Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : We will get onto the comparative track records to date, but that project reveals all of the advantages — Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : If the government is so rigorous, where is the business case for Oakajee? We are still waiting. Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : Leader of the Opposition, a sample of 50 major building projects commenced before June 2009 highlights the problem. This is the previous government’s record: in June 2009, just after we launched the works reform project, the total budget of the projects was $3.9 billion compared with an original approved budget of $1.5 billion. The overrun of $2.4 billion represents a staggering 153 per cent of the original approved budget. Almost half of all projects in question exceeded original budgets by more than 100 per cent. It is early days for our government. The Leader of the Opposition has asked for some kind of comparative analysis, but it is early days — Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : I asked for the business plan for Oakajee. The Treasurer can give us the business case for the waterfront project. Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : The total budget of the six major building projects valued at $50 million or more and commenced after June 2009 has increased by less than two per cent, from $1.05 billion to $1.07 billion. When we extend that analysis out to all 26 projects valued at $10 million or more, the increase is less than one per cent. Looking at the success of that process, I have three good graphical representations. These are all the non-residential building programs commenced prior to the works reform of this government. It is laminated, at low cost! Members will see there that of the $10 million to $50 million projects, the previous government only had a 5.5 per cent cost overrun. In the $50 million to $100 million projects, the previous government had a 28.4 per cent cost overrun. In the projects valued at over $100 million, the overrun cost was $178.4 million; with a grand average of 92.2 per cent cost overrun on those projects. Now we look at this government’s poster work reform process. The numbers are somewhat less. The cost overruns of projects valued at $10 million to $50 million is 0.8 per cent; $50 million to $100 million is nine per cent; and over $100 million it is 2.2 per cent — Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : Is the current state of the building industry in Western Australia relevant at all? Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : As I conceded, construction costs were problematic but as members opposite must concede the other problems were governance and management. Dare I read the Auditor General’s report again! We have changed what could be changed. The results speak for themselves. Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Finally, the averages: red is the projects commenced by the previous government, cost overruns of 92.2 per cent. Where we have inherited those projects and there have been cost increases, they have been limited to 0.3 per cent; where we have commenced projects, the cost overruns have been limited to 2.4 per cent. Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr E.S. Ripper : That is a tiny sample. Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
Mr C.C. PORTER : It is the sample that is available. It shows an immense improvement.
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Debates, questions, speeches and sentiment.
Tabled Papers
Reports and documents tabled in Parliament.
Committees
Committee profiles and recent reports.
Regulations
Subsidiary legislation with filters and summaries.
Bills
Proposed laws and parliamentary progress.
Acts
Current WA legislation and summaries.
Explanatory Memoranda
Bills with EMs (text/PDF) available.
Members
MP profiles, party breakdown and rankings.
Pollie Rankings
Data-driven rankings across 19 categories.
Amendment Chains
Track how schemes and regulations evolve over time.