A WA parliamentary question on notice addresses the implementation of performance incentives in government property facilities management contracts following an Auditor General's report. The response reveals limited adoption and eventual removal of incentive clauses due to lack of demonstrable improvement.

AnsweredQoN 771Legislative Council
Asked
19 September 2006
Portfolio
Housing and Works

QuestionView source ↗

AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT NO 7, AUGUST 2001 - GOOD HOUSEKEEPING: FACILITIES MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES AND BUILDINGS
I refer to the answer to question on notice 3775. (1) What performance incentives were established as a result of recommendation 5? (2) Why were only two contracts established for such performance incentives? (3) Did they achieve the desired outcomes? (4) If not, have they been modified as a result? (5) If yes to (4), why have they not been extended to other contracts? (6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST

AnswerView source ↗

I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(1) What performance incentives were established as a result of recommendation 5? (2) Why were only two contracts established for such performance incentives? (3) Did they achieve the desired outcomes? (4) If not, have they been modified as a result? (5) If yes to (4), why have they not been extended to other contracts? (6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(2) Why were only two contracts established for such performance incentives? (3) Did they achieve the desired outcomes? (4) If not, have they been modified as a result? (5) If yes to (4), why have they not been extended to other contracts? (6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(3) Did they achieve the desired outcomes? (4) If not, have they been modified as a result? (5) If yes to (4), why have they not been extended to other contracts? (6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(4) If not, have they been modified as a result? (5) If yes to (4), why have they not been extended to other contracts? (6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(5) If yes to (4), why have they not been extended to other contracts? (6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(6) How many other contracts have been established in the same period? (7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(7) What action has been taken in respect of these contracts to achieve performance incentives? Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
Hon KATE DOUST replied: I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
I thank the member for some notice of this question. The Department of Housing and Works advises - (1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(1) The performance incentives for the Central TAFE contract include an agreement that Central TAFE and the contractor would contribute $20 000 to establish an annual pool of $40 000, 25 per cent of which is to be payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by the timely invoicing of works and client satisfaction or improved client satisfaction, and other agreed indicators include, but are not limited to, enhanced operational efficiencies, reduced operational costs, and the improved performance of building services. The performance incentives for the education contracts include a $50 000 contribution by the Department of Education and Training and the contractor to establish an annual pool of $100 000, 25 per cent of which is payable each quarter. The performance of the contract is measured by client satisfaction on works projects worth greater than $25 000, annual surveys of all schools in a contractor’s area, and other agreed indicators. (2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(2) Three contracts were established with performance incentives. One is for Central TAFE and the other is for the Department of Education and Training. Those contracts were mistakenly counted as one contract in the previous response. Discussions with all the potential client agencies failed to convince most of them of the advantages of an incentive arrangement against the competing need for maintenance funds. Only the Department of Education and Training and Central TAFE are willing to include incentive clauses in their service arrangement contracts. (3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(3) The performance of the contractors on the above contracts was no different from the performance of the other service arranger contracts. Therefore, the incentive scheme was not justified. (4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(4) The incentive clauses were removed from the contract by agreement with all parties. (5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(5) Not applicable. (6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(6) Eight other contracts were established in that period. (7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.
(7) Because of the above, no other incentive arrangements were included in the service arranging contracts. Normal contract management activities of the Department of Housing and Works ensure the performance of contractors.

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