A WA parliamentary question addresses discrepancies in ex gratia payments for wrongful imprisonment, specifically comparing the Mallard and Mickelberg cases, and questions the need for legislation establishing a right to compensation.

AnsweredQoN 549Legislative Council
Asked
21 May 2009
Portfolio
minister representing the Attorney General

QuestionView source ↗

WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT — EX GRATIA PAYMENTS
I refer to ex gratia payments to people who have been wrongly imprisoned and to the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Amendment (Compensation) Bill 2008, which was recently assented to. (1) How does the Attorney General explain the difference between the amount of compensation paid to Andrew Mallard and the amount paid to the Mickelberg brothers when looking at the amounts paid per days spent in prison? (2) Will the Attorney General introduce legislation to establish a right to compensation for wrongful imprisonment in cases such as the Mallard and Mickelberg cases? (3) If yes to (2), when? (4) If no to (2), why not? Hon SIMON O’BRIEN

AnswerView source ↗

I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(1) How does the Attorney General explain the difference between the amount of compensation paid to Andrew Mallard and the amount paid to the Mickelberg brothers when looking at the amounts paid per days spent in prison? (2) Will the Attorney General introduce legislation to establish a right to compensation for wrongful imprisonment in cases such as the Mallard and Mickelberg cases? (3) If yes to (2), when? (4) If no to (2), why not? Hon SIMON O’BRIEN replied: I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(2) Will the Attorney General introduce legislation to establish a right to compensation for wrongful imprisonment in cases such as the Mallard and Mickelberg cases? (3) If yes to (2), when? (4) If no to (2), why not? Hon SIMON O’BRIEN replied: I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(3) If yes to (2), when? (4) If no to (2), why not? Hon SIMON O’BRIEN replied: I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(4) If no to (2), why not? Hon SIMON O’BRIEN replied: I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
Hon SIMON O’BRIEN replied: I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
I thank the honourable member for some notice of the question. (1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(1) The ex gratia payment agreed to be paid to Andrew Mallard and the payments made to the Mickelberg brothers were not calculated on a per-day-spent-in-prison basis. The payment to Mr Mallard was an act of grace payment and therefore its payment and its quantum were totally at the discretion of the executive government and represented a monetary recognition of the fact of Mr Mallard’s wrongful conviction and subsequent imprisonment. It was not a payment in the nature of compensation and was paid without any admission of liability in that regard. (2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(2) There are potential causes of action at law already available to Mr Mallard. He is free to pursue any of them as he wishes. The Attorney General does not intend to legislate to either create new causes of action that may bear on the present circumstances, or to limit presently existing causes of action that bear on the present circumstances. (3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(3) Not applicable. (4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.
(4) It is unnecessary. The present law on the subject, as it is relevant to Mr Mallard’s circumstances, is longstanding and clear.

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